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FOREWORD

Variations in the size of the population receiving disability payments across countries
cannot be explained by simple differences in health. Rather, the process to disability is shaped by
both social and medical factors. When governments ignore this reality, a policy generated
disability epidemic is possible. This paper compares disability policies in The Netherlands,
Sweden, Germany, and the United States. It argues that the extraordinary increase in Dutch
disability rolls in the 1970s was caused by a general government policy to reduce official
unemployment. And that by the end of the 1980s, this policy had left Holland with a hidden
unemployment rate that was twice its official rate and three times the unemployment rates in the
United States and Germany.
Parts of this paper were written while Burkhauser was a Fellow at the Netherlands
Institute for Advanced Study in the Humanities and Social Sciences in Wassenaar, The
Netherlands, and while he was a visiting scholar at the Deutsche Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung
in Berlin, Germany. It could not have been completed without the assistance of Petri Hirvonen in
providing information on the German disability system and Eskil Wadenski in providing
information on the Swedish disability system. However, the opinions expressed here are those of
the authors.
Leo Aarts is Director, Research Group on Jurimetrics and Social Security, Law Faculty,
University of Leiden, The Netherlands; Richard V. Burkhauser is Professor of Economics and
Senior Research Associate, Metropolitan Studies Program, The Maxwell School, Syracuse
University; and Philip de Jong is a member of the Research Group on Expert Systems and Social
Security, Faculty of Law, University of Leiden, The Netherlands.

David Greytak, Director
Metropolitan Studies Program
February, 1992

A CAUTIONARY TALE OF EUROPEAN DISABILITY POLICIES:
LESSONS FOR THE UNITED STATES

An epidemic of dangerous proportion gripped Western industrialized countries in the
1970s. While its symptoms were the same across countries, the curatives used were substantially
different, especially in the United States and have had very mixed results over the last decade.
The epidemic is labelled disability. Here we unfold a cautionary tale on the limits of good
intentions by contrasting the rise and fall of disability populations in the Netherlands, the United
States, Sweden, and Germany over the past two decades.
A Cross-National Comparison of Disability Incidence
As recently as 1970 the ratio of disability transfer recipients to workers in the Netherlands
was similar to that in Sweden and Germany. In all three countries there were only about 50
people of working age--15 to 64--receiving payments from the government to offset lost wages
due to a health condition for every 1,000 workers in that age group. This modest rate was,
nevertheless, about twice that in the United States (see Table 1).
Over the next decade the incidence of disability grew significantly in each of these
countries but exploded in the Netherlands. Where once only 14 younger persons (aged 15 to 44)
received disability transfers in the Netherlands for every 1,000 young workers, there were 49 in
1980, an increase of 50 percent.
Of course, as we grow older we are more likely to suffer ill-health, so the ratio of disability
transfer recipients to workers increases with age. In the Netherlands in 1970 over 100 middleaged persons (aged 45 to 59) were receiving disability benefits for every 1,000 middle-aged
workers and the ratio for older working age persons (aged 60 to 64) was about 300 per 1,000.
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TABLE 1
DISABILITY TRANSFER RECIPIENTS PER THOUSAND ACTIVE
LABOR FORCE PARTICIPANTS, 1970-1989

1970

1975

1980

Percent
Change
1970s

1985

1989 a

Percent
Change
1980s

Population:
Aged 15-64
Netherlands

49

77

126

157

130

139

10

United States

27

42

41

52

51

43

5

Sweden

49

67

68

39

74

78

15

Germany

51

54

59

16

72

55

-7

Netherlands

14

28

49

250

50

53

8

United States

11

17

16

45

20

23

44

Sweden

18

20

19

6

20

21

11

Germany

7

6

7

0

8

5

-29

Netherlands

102

164

269

164

279

317

18

United States

33

68

83

152

71

72

-13

Sweden

66

95

99

50

108

116

17

Germany

75

64

84

12

103

75

-11

Netherlands

274

410

989

261

1,249

1,932

95

United States

154

265

285

85

254

250

-12

Sweden

229

382

382

67

512

577

51

Germany

419

688

1348

222

1,291

1,109

-18

Aged 15-44

Aged 45-59

Aged 60-64

a

The numbers for the Netherlands refer to 1990.

SOURCE: Updates from compiled tables in Haveman, Halberstadt, and Burkhauser (1984).
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But, by 1980 the ratio for the middle-aged population was nearly as high as that of the
older population at the start of the decade--almost 269 per 1,000. And by 1980 in the older
working population there were almost as many persons receiving disability transfers as there were
working!
This explosive growth in Dutch disability incidence slowed substantially in the 1980s. But
was still at a record high of 139 per 1,000 workers in 1989, and among older workers, disability
transfer recipients outnumbered workers almost two to one.
What plague so debilitated the Dutch work force in the 1970s? What slowed its pace in
the 1980s? And, was this a world wide phenomena or endemic to the Netherlands? Table 1
begins to answer these questions. Sweden, Germany, and even the United States experienced
substantial increases in their disability transfer populations in the 1970s. But in the United States
after a rise in the first part of the decade, disability transfer rates steadied at around 40 per 1,000,
well below the European rates at the start of the decade. Growth in Germany has been even more
modest. After rising to a high of 72 per 1,000 in 1985, it is back to 1970s levels. Sweden's rates
have risen modestly over the past two decades but are still around one-half those of the
Netherlands. Importantly in both Germany and Sweden, there has been almost no growth in the
disability transfer rates of younger workers. The virulent strain of disability appears endemic to
the Netherlands.
Table 1 suggests that the Netherlands and to a lesser extent the other countries
experienced a health related phenomena that affected the work of an alarming number of their
citizens. But we will suggest that the root cause of the increased incidence of disability over the
past two decades had more to do with the policy medicine these countries provided their healthimpaired workers than to any change in the underlying health of their citizens. Hence, the cure lay
more in the realm of social policy than medical policy.
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Disability Labelling
To be labelled disabled, one must have some health condition that limits the ability to
work. But disability also has a social context. Work limitations can be offset either by job
changes or changes in some of the activities of the job one held at the time of onset of the work
limitation. Burkhauser and Kim (1991), for instance, shows that accommodation of this sort by
private employers in the United States significantly lengthened the time until their work impaired
employees left the firm.
Alternatively, rehabilitation therapy together with government sponsored transition jobs
can help overcome work limitations. But social policy can also discourage work and accelerate
the disability process. By cushioning the blow of poor health, transfer benefits may also provide a
comfortable alternative to work. But this kind of policy medicine has a potentially dangerous side
effect. It can encourage the worker to lose the determination to overcome a health impairment
and continue working. And like all medicine, an overdose acts like a poison.
To understand the process to disability one must know not only the medical but the social
context in which this process unfolds. In general, workers with disabilities were able-bodied for
most of their work life. Thus for most such workers, the transition from able-bodied to disabled
begins with a health impairment which restricts to some degree their ability to work on a job they
hold. At this point, the movement to disability is significantly affected by the options such
workers have. The greater the share of wage earnings the disability system replaces and the
higher the probability that the worker will meet the criteria for these benefits, the faster this
transition will take place.
Employer behavior also effects this decision. Health impairments can effect productivity
on the job, and unless accommodations are made, this can result in pressure on the worker to
leave. In addition, general economic conditions can lead employers and union officials to
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encourage health-impaired workers to leave when layoffs are necessary. This is particularly the
case when such workers are near retirement age. Government policy also plays an important role
in this decision that goes beyond the level and ease of accessibility to benefits. Health-impaired
workers are also more likely to apply for disability benefits rather than unemployment or
retirement benefits when they are more generous or longer lasting than these alternative methods
of protecting workers. And as we will see in the case of the Netherlands, general labor market
policy and the willingness of government to maintain a high wage policy at the expense of high
employment may ultimately have more to do with determining the employment of health-impaired
workers than specific disability rules.
When the social aspects of the process to disability are ignored by policymakers, a policy
inspired disability epidemic is possible. Public policy in the Netherlands in the 1970s allowed
everyone to be comfortable in the face of illness and hence to ignore its consequences.
It was comfortable for the worker who received the benefit, comfortable for the employer
who no longer had to take responsibility for accommodating the worker, comfortable for the
worker's union who saw this as a way of not only protecting a fellow worker but also perhaps
opening a new position for an unemployed union member, and even comfortable for the
government if it meant the official unemployment rate was lower. Eventually the enormous social
burden of this policy was recognized but has not been easily corrected.
The Evolution of Disability Transfer Programs
The substantial movement in the incidence of disability transfer populations over time and
across countries can not be explained by shifts in or differences across countries in underlying
health conditions. To understand these movements it is necessary to understand the disability
policies that caused them. Table 2 contrasts the growth in the major disability transfer programs
of the Netherlands, the United States, Sweden, and Germany over the past two decades.

TABLE 2
DISABILITY TRANSFER GROWTH, 1970-1989 (THOUSANDS)

1970

1975

1980

186

322

44

Percent Change
1970s

Percent Change
1980s

1985

1989

565

632

706

57

108

130

177

230

379

673

762

883

1,394

2,489

2,859

2,656

2,999

870

1,723

1,777

1,942

2,210

2,264

4,212

4,635

105

4,598

5,209

12

188

289

293

56

323

361

23

Full disability pensions

812

980

1,237

1,563

1,256

Partial disability pensions

387

255

182

142

114

17

76

258

255

1,252

1,495

1,963

1,625

The Netherlands
All disability pensions
Partial disability pensions
Total

193

31

United States
Disability insurance
Supplemental security income
Total
Sweden
Total
Germany

Early retirement for handicapped
Total
SOURCE: See Table 1.

1,199

25

9

7
The Netherlands

The first level of protection against income loss in the Dutch system is the sickness benefit.
This payment replaces 70 percent of wages for up to one year, but most employees (90 percent)
and all civil servants have the rest of net of tax earnings replaced by collective bargaining
agreements with their employers. Those who are still receiving these benefits after one year are
evaluated to estimate their residual earnings capacity. If they have a chronic condition that causes
a reduction in their capacity to perform work commensurate with their job training and work
history, they are eligible for disability benefits. Those who are judged partially disabled are
eligible for partial benefits, the minimum degree of impairment for eligibility is 15 percent. In the
1970s replacement rates ranged from 9 percent of before-tax earnings to 80 percent for the fully
disabled.
The social nature of disability labelling is evident when eligibility criteria are implemented.
To determine the level of the disability benefit it is necessary to determine which jobs are
commensurate with the workers current health-impaired job skills. But theoretical disability will
diverge from actual earnings if the partially disabled person does not become employed in such a
job. In this case, it is difficult to disentangle lack of employment due to the health condition from
that due to general market conditions, from discrimination or from an unwillingness to work.
A legal measure called the "labor market consideration" had a profound effect on this
determination. It was ruled that unless proven to the contrary it would be assumed that lack of
employment by a partially disabled worker was the result of discriminatory behavior. As a result,
the ensuing administrative practice was that unemployed partially disabled persons were treated as
if they were fully disabled. This interpretation of the law made assessment of theoretical earnings
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capacity unnecessary since a minimum impairment of 15 percent was sufficient to entitle a person
to a full benefit.
The relative generosity of the system increased for another reason in the 1970s. While the
80 percent cap on before-tax wage earnings remained in place over this period, the after tax
replacement rate rose because disability recipients did not pay social security taxes on their
benefits. These taxes were raised substantially in the 1970s so that while the average real after tax
wages of workers rose by only 7 percent, it grew by 16 percent for the average beneficiary over
the decade. As can be seen in Table 2, these increases in eligibility and in generosity of the system
had a profound effect on the size of the disability transfer population. It nearly tripled over the
decade.
The serious recession of the early 1980s and the growing costs of the disability system put
enormous pressure on the government to reduce the growth of disability transfers. By 1985 a
series of cuts in the before-tax replacement rate had effectively lowered it from 80 to 70 percent
of earnings for both new entrants and for current beneficiaries. The cumulative effects of these
cuts was a reduction of almost 25 percent in net real income of disabled workers over the first five
years of the decade relative to a drop of 10 percent for able-bodied workers. For the median
worker, after tax replacement rates dropped from 87 percent at the end of the 1970s to 70 percent
at the end of the 1980s.
But this did not totally halt system growth, and after sustained public debate, the Dutch
parliament passed additional disability amendments which became effective in 1987. The most
important was the abolition of the labor market consideration rule. But as can be seen in Table 2
while the share of partial to full disability pensions has increased slightly in the last five years, 80
percent of disability beneficiaries were still receiving full benefits in 1989.
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Despite the legal ban on including labor market considerations in their disability
assessments, disability adjudicators still seem to either grant or deny full benefits. Denial rates
have remained quite low since 1987. Between 1980 and 1986 denial rates among those who
completed their one-year stay on sickness benefit averaged about 5 percent. In 1987 denial rates
averaged 8 percent and in 1988 they were 7 percent. So it is likely that this de jure change has
not stopped the de facto use of labor market considerations in the adjudication process.
Aarts and de Jong (1990) provides empirical evidence that the Dutch disability system's
mix of generous transfer payments and broad eligibility criteria are directly responsible for the rise
in disability labelling in the Netherlands. Aarts and de Jong (1991) using a simulation model
predicts that, unless current policies are changed, the greying of the post World War II baby
boom in the Netherlands will produce an increase of over 80 percent in disability rolls over the
next two decades and an increase of from 139 to about 218 disability transfer recipients per 1,000
workers.

The United States

The United States disability policy has substantially more limited goals than Dutch policy.
Many workers have sickness benefits as part of their employer's fringe benefit package but some
do not. No short-term social sickness insurance programs exist in the United States. Workers
whose health impairment is expected to be long lasting, however, are eligible for disability
benefits. But in contrast to the Netherlands, eligibility is limited to the fully impaired. That is, to
workers who are expected to be unable to perform any substantial gainful activities for at least
eleven months. In principle, the definition of activities includes all types of work not merely work
related to past training or job experience and whether such work is available. But even in the
United States, labor market criteria enter into the disability process.
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Despite this strict eligibility criteria, the 1970s were a time of substantial increases in the
disability population. One reason for this increase was an increase in the generosity of the system.
Congress changed the disability insurance benefit calculation so that the net replacement rate for a
disabled worker with median earnings increased from 35 percent at the start of the 1970s to 49
percent at the end with the great majority of that increase occurring in the early 1970s (Haveman,
Halberstadt, and Burkhauser, 1984). In addition, in 1974 the federally run supplemental security
income program replaced the aid to the aged, blind, and disabled programs run by the states. This
program provides a federal minimum income for the disabled regardless of past work history.
But another and more important reason for the increase was that the strict health criteria
used to determine eligibility for both programs was liberalized in the early 1970s by increasing the
use of an individual's vocational characteristics--age, education, and type of job skills--in such
determinations. As was the case in the Netherlands, this allowed market conditions to enter into
the disability determination. Hence, fringe workers, those who were older, less educated, or who
only had a history of physical labor, and who were less likely to be employed as their health
worsened, became more likely to be ruled eligible.
As can be seen in Table 2, growth in these transfer programs slowed in the second half of
the decade. The disability program population peaked in 1978 and actually fell over the next five
years thanks to the substantial tightening of eligibility standards--especially the reduced use of
vocational characteristics--under the Carter Administration and major reevaluations of already
eligible recipients in the early years of the Reagan Administration. Thus despite the most serious
economic downturn since the 1930s and the pressure this put on the disability system, disability
rolls were 10 percent lower in 1983 than in 1980. The widespread reevaluation of those already
on the disability rolls ended in 1983 as first the courts and then Congress restricted the power of
the Social Security Administration to reevaluate beneficiaries (Weaver, 1986).
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Since 1983 the eligible population has increased modestly. Growth in the supplementary
security income population followed the same path as disability insurance over the period falling
slightly in the first three years of the Reagan Administration but increasing more rapidly over the
rest of the decade. Overall growth in the two programs in the 1980s has been a small fraction of
the previous decade's growth.

Sweden

Sweden differs dramatically from the Netherlands and the United States in its commitment
to keeping work impaired persons in the labor market. So while the first level of protection
against income loss in Sweden is the sickness benefit, it is relatively temporary. Workers receive
90 percent of their wage income lost because of sickness. After 90 days the local insurance office
investigates to see if rehabilitation is necessary. Only those unable to respond to rehabilitation and
work in a private sector or, if necessary, a government provided job are placed on the disability
transfers rolls. For those workers who cannot be rehabilitated, eligibility is determined on medical
grounds but labor market conditions are also considered.
Replacement rates in Sweden are as generous as in the Netherlands. Benefits for the
median worker were about 75 percent of net wage earnings in the 1970s and increased to almost
90 percent in the 1980s. However, disability incidence is substantially smaller than in the
Netherlands and the growth in the transfer rolls much lower.
The major reason for this growth in the rolls over the past two decades has been a change
in the work requirement for impaired older workers. Starting in the 1970s, workers over the age
of sixty could become eligible for benefits owing solely to labor market conditions. For example,
long-term unemployed older workers not yet eligible for social security retirement benefits
became automatically eligible for disability benefits once their unemployment benefits ran out.
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Thus, while Swedish disability rolls have risen 23 percent in the last decade, the great majority of
that growth has been among older workers.

Germany

German employers are required by government mandate to provide up to six weeks of
fully paid sickness benefits to their workers each year. For workers requiring a longer period,
national health insurance replaces 80 percent of their last regular wage income. Eligibility for
disability pension benefits is determined on medical grounds but labor market conditions are also
taken into consideration.
Workers who are unable to earn a regular income due to reductions in physical or mental
capacity are eligible for a full benefit. Workers whose impairment reduces their earnings capacity
by one-half when compared with other workers with similar training and experience are eligible
for a partial benefit. For those who do not respond to medical or vocational rehabilitation,
permanent disability benefits are provided. The net replacement for a full disability pensioner who
earned the median wage over his lifetime was about 60 percent in the 1970s and about 64 percent
in the 1980s. A partial benefit is exactly two-thirds that of a full benefits.
As can be seen in Table 2, Germany experienced the smallest increase--25 percent--in its
transfer population in the 1970s and a 9 percent increase in the 1980s. A major change has taken
place in the mix of benefits provided, however. Almost all beneficiaries now receive full disability
pensions. This was due to a change in the system, initiated in 1969 and extended in 1975, which
provided a full disability pension to unemployed partially disabled workers.
Thus in Germany as well as in the other countries discussed, there has been a blurring of
health and unemployment aspects of disability policy. This is especially true for health-impaired
older workers. While the earliest retirement age for able-bodied male workers in Germany is
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sixty-three, unemployed health-impaired older workers can begin to receive disability related
retirement benefits at age sixty. This effective reduction in the retirement age has substantially
increased the incidence of disability transfers in the older population over the past two decades.
For younger health-impaired workers, this is less the case. They are offered substantial
rehabilitation services and the government attempts to maintain them in the labor force with a
quota system. All firms employing 16 or more workers must employ one health-impaired worker
for each 16 workers employed.
The Dutch Disease of the 1970s
This brief description of disability policy makes clear that Dutch policy during the 1970s
was substantially out of step with its European neighbors as well as with the United States. This
explains why its disability rolls rose so much faster than those of the other countries.
Dutch social policy was out of step with Sweden not because it offered more generous
benefits but because it failed to emphasize rehabilitation and maintenance of the worker in the
labor market. In Sweden, except for older workers, transfers are used only as a last resort after
rehabilitation and work in a government sponsored transition job fails. A major reason for
Sweden's low transfer rate, despite very high benefits, is that strong social pressure is put on those
with job impairments to stick with rehabilitation programs and work rather than accept transfers.
And government jobs are provided, at least for younger health-impaired workers, who can not
find work in the private sector.
Dutch social policy was out of step with Germany in part because it offers somewhat
higher benefits and has less restricted eligibility rules (i.e., both countries provided full benefits for
partially health-impaired unemployed workers, but the minimum impairment rate in Germany was
50 percent rather than the 15 percent in the Netherlands), but also because Germany has an active
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policy to keep health-impaired workers on the job which includes subsidies to accommodate these
workers and a quota system to encourage employers to maintain them in the workplace.
Ironically, Dutch and United States disability policies were the most similar in the 1970s,
and not surprisingly, they experienced the greatest growth in their disability transfer populations.
The United States started the decade with a substantially lower disability incidence than these
three European countries. But as a result of substantial increases in benefits and in the use of
vocational characteristics to determine eligibility, its transfer population doubled by the end of the
decade and its incidence rate neared these European countries at the start of the decade.
Dutch and American Policy Outcomes in the 1980s
Given these differing policy experiences in the 1970s, it is not surprising that it was in the
Netherlands and in the United States that cries for reform of the disability system were most
loudly heard in the 1980s. Both governments significantly reduced the growth in their systems
during very difficult economic times and, to some degree, at the expense of their disabled
populations.

The timing of this change in policy is particularly noteworthy because in the 1970s

the disability systems of all four countries had been under increasing pressure to consider
employment conditions as well as health conditions as criteria for disability eligibility. Thus in the
absence of policy changes, one would have expected disability rolls to increase during bad
economic times. Yet it was during the deepest world recession since the 1930s that disability rolls
were actually cut in the United States and the rate of increase substantially reduced in the
Netherlands.
The dramatic shift in disability policy started by the Carter Administration and vigorously
pursued by the Reagan Administration was extremely controversial. Purging the disability rolls of
those who are capable of doing some gainful activities may comply with the letter of the law but
still may put an enormous burden on the families of health-impaired workers, who also may have
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poor job skills that put them on the outer fringes of the labor market even in good times. Because
such workers are likely to be the hardest hit by recession, it was argued that this policy forced the
least able in society to bear the greatest burden of the recession.
A counter argument to this point of view was that in the long run the best government
palliative to the health-impaired population was not more access to transfers that discourage work
but a strong economy that would provide work for all who wanted it.
The recession of 1983 was followed by seven years of economic growth, and Table 3
provides some evidence on this issue. It looks at the wage earnings of health-impaired men as a
percentage of the wage earnings of able-bodied men in the 1970s and 1980s. And it looks at the
relative family income for such men over this period. These ratios are also provided within
educational classes. The results provide mixed evidence for those who believe that this
tough-minded, short-run policy was better in the long-run.
On average, the relative wage earnings of health-impaired men fell in the 1970s, but
relative family income rose as transfer benefits became more generous and widespread in the first
part of the 1970s. The drop in both benefits and wage earnings in the last part of that decade and
in the recession years of the next attests to the increasing relative hardship of this population. By
1987, four years into the economic recovery, the relative wage earnings of health-impaired men
had not risen from their recession period low. But the relative family income of these healthimpaired men had. In fact, recovery brought faster and greater increases to the families
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TABLE 3
FAMILY ECONOMIC WELL-BEING OF HEALTH-IMPAIRED MEN IN
THE UNITED STATES RELATIVE TO ABLE-BODIED MEN
ACROSS EDUCATION LEVELS, 1967-1987

1967

1972

1975

1979

1981

1983

1987

Wage Earnings of Health-Impaired Men as a Percentage of Able-Bodied
Overall

.66

.74

.66

.58

.51

.54

.49

High School Dropout

.62

.67

.36

.46

.29

.32

.30

High School Degree

.77

.75

.65

.62

.44

.57

.64

High School Plus

.69

.85

.93

.70

.64

.71

.72

Family Incomea of Health-Impaired Men as a Percentage of Able-Bodied
Overall

.74

.80

.80

.73

.66

.72

.75

High School Dropout

.78

.81

.78

.75

.70

.72

.71

High School Degree

.88

.84

.84

.76

.69

.74

.91

High School Plus

.78

.83

.89

.79

.75

.83

.89

a

Family income is adjusted for household size by using the official poverty line equivalency scale values.

SOURCE: Compiled from table in Burkhauser et al. (1992).
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of health-impaired men than to able-bodied families. In large part, this was a result of increasing
wage earnings but not so much that of the health-impaired men as that of their family members.
By 1987 the family income of high school and college-educated, health-impaired workers
was at a two decade high relative to their able-bodied counterparts both because their wage
earnings had fully recovered from the recession and because of the added earnings of other family
members. But this long-run success story was not universal. For the doubly handicapped, men
with very poor education (and by proxy those most likely to have poor work skills) as well as a
health impairment, there has been no recovery from the recession either in wage earnings or in
family income.
Painting the Roses Red
Each society must evaluate the burden that it will permit its citizens to bear when they
suffer a health impairment or the loss of a job. And must weigh this against the burden such
protection places on able-bodied workers in that society. Cross-national comparisons permits one
to look at the outcomes of alternative national policies. This is often as close to a "counterfactual" with respect to what actually happened as policymakers are likely to see. Hence as
policymakers in the United States are asked to develop policies for the 1990s in the light of policy
outcomes in the 1980s, it is useful to look at how the Netherlands "cured" its disability problem.
Disability transfers are sensitive to the business cycle--down in good times, up in bad
times. When jobs are hard to find, using the disability rolls to protect the unemployed is a
comfortable way of easing the bad effects of economic downturns. But a policy of labelling the
unemployed as disabled is much like the policy of the cards in Alice in Wonderland who painted
the roses red.
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Painting the roses red does little to correct the underlying problem of the rose bush.
Labelling unemployed people as disabled does little to correct the underlying problems in the
economy and may retard the return of such workers to the work force during recovery.
In the 1970s the Netherlands vigorously pursued a policy of labelling the unemployed as
disabled. Table 4 shows that the official unemployment rates in the United States were
substantially higher than those in the Netherlands during this period. But if one considers that
part of the Dutch unemployed population was hidden in the disability rolls, then "true"
unemployment during this period changes substantially.
If one assumes that the true underlying disability rate in the Netherlands was in fact the
same as that in the United States during the 1970s--see Table 1--and that all the disabled on the
rolls above this baseline were actually hidden unemployed, then the Dutch unemployment rate
increases from 1 percent to 3.1 percent in 1970 and from 6 to 13.4 percent in 1980. And when
these "truer" measures of unemployment are compared with the United States, the much more
serious nature of unemployment in the Netherlands is clearly seen.
Both the United States and the Netherlands drastically changed their disability policies in
the 1980s. As we have seen, in the United States this lead to serious short-run problems for the
health-impaired population as a whole and long-term problems for the doubly handicapped. But
after 1983, the United States also experienced seven years of economic growth and a drop in
unemployment to rates near those at the start of the 1970s. And these low rates were not
achieved by hiding the unemployed on the disability rolls. In 1989 disability rolls were only
slightly higher than at their peak in the late 1970s.
While we have seen that the Dutch began to end their policy of painting the roses red in
the 1980s, at considerable cost to the disabled population, they did not end their unemployment
problem. Many of the unemployed that would have come onto the rolls during the Dutch
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TABLE 4
OFFICIAL AND HIDDEN UNEMPLOYMENT RATES IN
THE NETHERLANDS, 1970-1989

1970

1975

1980

1983

1985

1989

United States

4.8

8.3

7.0

9.5

7.1

5.2

Germany

0.6

3.6

2.9

8.0

7.2

5.6

Netherlands

1.0

5.2

6.0

12.0

10.6

8.3

United States Baseda

3.1

8.4

13.4

19.0

17.9

16.3

German Basedb

1.0

7.3

11.9

17.0

15.5

15.4

Official Unemployment Rates

Dutch Hidden Unemployment Rates

a

Adds those on disability rolls above the United States disability prevalence rate to the official unemployed.
Adds those on disability rolls above the German prevalence rate to official unemployed.

b

SOURCE: Previous tables plus International Labor Organization (1990).
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economic recession of the early 1980s did not do so. But they did go onto the unemployment
rolls. In 1980 the official Dutch unemployment rate was close to that of the United States. But at
the depth of the recession, it had increased to 12 percent--more than 25 percent higher than in the
United States. While recovery has also occurred in the Netherlands and official unemployment
rates are now lower, they still remain a relatively high 8.3 percent and they are 60 percent higher
than in the United States. But if we continue our comparison of hidden unemployment into the
1980s, we see that the story gets considerably worse. In 1989 when hidden unemployment within
the disability population is included, the Dutch unemployment rate increases from 8.3 to 16.3
percent, more than three times that of the United States.
Because United States disability rules are considerably tighter and less generous than the
Dutch and have excluded all but the most severely health-impaired, using this restrictive definition
of disability forces a very high share of the Dutch disabled population into the hidden
unemployed. An alternative definition is also considered in Table 4. Assume that the true
disability incidence rate in the Netherlands is the same as that in Germany where the partially
health-impaired are also granted full benefits if they are unemployed. In this case, the hidden
unemployment rate is slightly lower but still shows the tremendous post-recession gap between
the United States and the Netherlands. True unemployment in the Netherlands is 15.4 percent in
1989, nearly three times that of both the United States and Germany. What Table 4 suggests is
that while changes in Dutch disability policy lessened the dangers of a runaway disability program,
the underlying unemployment problem was not corrected.
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The Dutch Economic Burden
Dutch social welfare policy guarantees a very high social safety net for all its citizens. The
Dutch minimum wage is extremely high relative to that of the United States. In United States'
dollars (two Guilder to the dollar) it costs an employer $16,000 per year to hire a full-time (38
hours per week) minimum wage worker. Family welfare payments which are by law universal, are
equal to 100 percent of the net of taxes minimum wage. Unemployment benefits are
approximately equal to disability payment.
Some consequences of these general labor market policies can be seen in Table 5. Since
1980 the number of employed persons in the Netherlands has increased by 19 percent. But the
great majority of this increase is due to the movement into the labor force of women doing
part-time work. When employment is adjusted to full-time work years, the decade long gain is
only 4 percent. In contrast, the three major transfer programs that provide benefits to people of
working age (aged 15-64) all grew enormously in the 1970s and have continued to grow at
substantial rates in the 1980s.
In Table 1 we showed the disability prevalence rate per 1,000 workers. In Table 5 we
expand this to include the prevalence of all working age transfer receipts per 1,000 full-time
workers. Just 20 years ago in The Netherlands there were only 69 working age transfer recipients
for every 1,000 full-time workers. Fueled mainly by a runaway disability program and a stagnant
work force, that ratio nearly tripled in the 1970s. The disability program was modified in the
1980s, but long-term unemployment due to the recession of the early 1980s resulted in a record
high prevalence rate of 333 in 1985. Lackluster employment growth since then means that the
Dutch begin the 1990s with three people of working age receiving transfers for every ten full-time
workers.

TABLE 5
WORK EFFORT AND SOCIAL WELFARE TRANSFERS IN THE NETHERLANDS, 1970-1990 (THOUSANDS)

1970

1975

1980

Percent Change
1970s

Employed Persons

5,204 a

5,161

5,500

6

Employed Work Years

4,709

4,670

4,807

2

196

312

605

Unemployment

58

197

Social Assistance

70

1983

1985

1990

Percent Change
1980s

8,650

6,550

19

4,531

4,589

4,980

4

209

660

695

766

27

235

305

615

650

526

124

117

117

67

155

183

182

56

324

626

957

195

1430

1528

1474

54

69

134

199

188

316

333

296

49

Transfers
Disability

Total
Transfer Recipients
(per thousand work years)

a

estimate

SOURCE: Compiled from tables in de Jong, Herwijer, and de Wildt (1990).
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The tax burden this places on the active work force is startling from a United States
perspective. The employer cost of a full-time, minimum wage worker is around $16,000 per year.
But 21 percent of that amount is employer based taxes and 20 percent is employee based taxes.
The workers net wage is only about $9,600. Put slightly differently the tax burden--shared by
both the employer and the employee--of hiring a full-time, minimum wage worker is equal to 70
percent of take-home pay. For higher wage workers the burden is even greater because of the
progressive income tax. (See de Jong, Herweijer, and de Wildt 1990 for a fuller discussion of the
Dutch social welfare system and its tax burden.)
Policies for the Future
All political parties in the Netherlands are urging major reforms of the Dutch social welfare
system. The prime minister has offered to resign if the disability population passes one million. In
January 1991 a major blue ribbon commission (Wetenschappelÿke Raad vour het Regeringsbeleid)
recommended reforms to parliament which, among other things, will lower the minimum wage
and, hence, the welfare benefits that are linked to it, reduce the tax on second earners in a
household and, thus, encourage women to enter the labor force in larger numbers, and further
restrict eligibility for disability benefits.
In the summer of 1991, the majority center-left coalition responded by agreeing to efforts
to reduce the disability population as part of their more general effort to lower taxes through
increased labor force participation. They submitted a broad set of measures aimed at maintaining
handicapped workers in the labor force. These included the introduction of experience rating for
the Sickness and Disability benefits programs; job protection for handicapped workers; and
increasing the scope of commensurate work those with handicaps were expected to accept before
they could receive disability payments.
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In addition, on July 14, 1991, the prime minister issued a highly controversial proposal to
limit the duration of the wage-related part of disability benefits for those who received benefits
prior to age 50. They would lose their entitlement to these second tier benefits after no more than
six years. It is still uncertain how this would effect those currently on the program.
Thus, even a country strongly committed to principles of solidarity and with a longstanding
commitment to high guaranteed levels of social welfare has paused to evaluate the results of its
social policies over the past two decades.
A review of the Dutch experience and that of the other countries studied here suggests that
disability policy is only a part of a broader labor market policy that each country must formulate
for itself. In the late 1970s and early 1980s the United States drastically reduced access to
disability benefits. This had a significant negative effect on the health-impaired population, but by
the end of the decade, strong economic growth had allowed the families of the health-impaired
with good job skills to recover. The unfinished work of social policy in the United States is to
provide protection to the doubly handicapped--those with both poor health and poor job skills-who have not recovered.
But as we investigate policies to correct these and other problems associated with the
widening inequality between wages earned in the United States caused in part by past social
policy, it is also important to remember the positive side of that policy--a strong and sustained
economic recovery and a growing United States work force. A cautionary lesson of the past two
decades of social welfare policies in the Netherlands is how difficult it is to fulfill social welfare
promises while maintaining the necessary labor force growth to keep them in the very structured
labor markets that such policies help create.
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